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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
entitled to compensation" and making the contract of insurance
a direct obligation in favor of such person. The court was un-
doubtedly pursuing the spirit of the law, but Justices LeBlanc
and Hamiter dissented on the theory that R.S. 22:658 was not
applicable to workmen's compensation insurance and that the
provision in question, being penal in nature, should be strictly
construed.
LEASE
J. Denson Smith*
The court had to deal with only two cases involving leases of
immovable property.' Both of these cases presented problems of
interpretation, and in each instance the opinion was well reasoned
and adequately supported by the provisions of the contract
of lease.
MINERAL RIGHTS
Harriet S. Daggettt
Taylor v. Kimbell' was a suit for cancellation of a lease, the
primary term of which had expired. The suit was successful,
since the proof adduced convinced the court that gas could not be
produced in paying quantities. Had the preponderance of evi-
dence on this point been to the contrary and facilities for market-
ing gas been unavailable, then the clause of the lease pleaded by
defendants for continuation of the life of the lease by payment
of shut-in gas well royalties would have been availing.
In Oil Well Supply Company v. Independent Oil Company2
Act 68 of 1942-1 was held to give a furnisher of supplies a priv-
ilege upon an oil and gas lease, when the supplies in question
had actually been used on the lease in connection with drilling,
even though no contractual relation had been proved between
the furnisher on the one hand and the owner, operator, producer
or driller, on the other.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Dean v. Pisciotta, 220 La. 725, 57 So. 2d 591 (1952); Loraine, Inc. v.
DiMartino, 221 La. 571, 59 So. 2d 887 (1952).
t Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 219 La. 731, 54 So. 2d 1 (1951).
2. 219 La. 936, 54 So. 2d 330 (1951).
3. Ia. R.S. 1950, 9:4861-4867.
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The case of Milling v. Collector of Revenue4 has recently
been treated at length in this REVIEW. 5 A second discussion would
be inappropriate after such a short interval. But the importance
of the decision, if it be carried forward into the many areas upon
which it touches, may warrant many future studies. Provisions
of the Civil Code dealing with ordinary leases have been invalu-
ably employed as a convenient legal vehicle to regulate mineral
leases. However, to place minerals in the category of recurring
returns from land or money appears to be unrealistic and fraught
with potentially dangerous legal consequences.
Pearce v. Southern Natural Gas Company6 held that payment
of delay rentals under a mineral lease to a party other than the
then owner of the land did not give the right to cancel the lease
when there had been no compliance with a specific clause in the
lease contract requiring that the lessee be notified of a change
in ownership. The lessee was not required to take notice of
public records showing the transfer.7
In Superior Oil Company v. Case8 an alleged transfer of a
mineral interest which would have vested in minors was found
to have been simulated and to be of no effect. The case of
Roy 0. Martin Lumber Company v. Hodge-Hunt Lumber Com-
pany9 was cited with approval for the statement that the court
was not being called upon to protect minors, but instead was being
asked to honor a maneuver made for the sole purpose of continu-
ing a servitude.
In Placid Oil Company v. George ° a proposed agreement to
unitize lands for production purposes had been confected in
which a paragraph appeared stating that drilling or production
on any part of the area would constitute an interruption of pre-
scription of any mineral rights in any of the lands covered by
the lease. Since this paragraph had been stricken by certain land-
owners, they obviously were not bound by it.
In Ware v. Baucum"' plaintiffs, having brought a jactitation
action, raised the question of possession only. They showed their
actual possession as owners of the land and the passage of more
4. 220 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679 (1952).
5. See Note, 12 LoUISIANA LAw REvIEw 491 (1952).
6. 220 La. 1094, 58 So. 2d 396 (1952).
7. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576, 46 So. 2d 907 (1950).
8. 221 La. 126, 58 So. 2d 733 (1952).
9. 190 La. 84, 181 So. 865 (1938).
10. 221 La. 200, 59 So. 2d 120 (1952).
11. 221 La. 259, 59 So. 2d 182 (1952).
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than ten years without exploration since a title to a mineral
servitude on the land had been recorded. The court said that
plaintiffs had established a presumption of lapse of servitude and
were permitted to maintain their action in jactitation based on
possession of the land and right to seek possession of minerals
thereon. The rebuttal of this presumption could only be made in
revendication. Such rebuttal would constitute trial of title, an
issue which may not be raised in a jactitation action.
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company v. Southwest Natural
Production Company12 plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
determining the proper method of dividing shares of production
owing to royalty and mineral owners. The sole question as
stated by the court was as follows:
"Are the royalty owners throughout the unit entitled to be
paid on the basis of the return from the sale of all gas and
distillate produced from the unit, or only on the basis of the
amounts realized by their own lessees from the sale of the
proportion of the production allocated to the tract in which
they have an interest?"' 3
After a thorough analysis of statutes and contracts the court
found the latter method of computation to be correct. Conserva-
tion statutes and their purpose were emphasized, and particular
stress was laid upon the fact that no recasting of ownership was
involved or would be valid. Royalty owners were not parties to
the contract involved and were not affected by it.
Horn v. Skelly Oil Company14 was remanded because of a
failure to join a party which the court thought necessary. A ques-
tion arose concerning the interpretation of an instrument provid-
ing for a "reservation" of minerals. The instrument was in connec-
tion with the sale of land by the Federal Land Bank and con-
tained the stipulation that the vendee of' the land was to have
full leasing power. If the document established a servitude, it
would have reverted to the present landowner, since no inter-
ruptions, suspensions or extensions had occurred. If royalty of
the Vincent-Bullock type had been created, this interest too had
lapsed. But it was maintained by subsequent lessees and servi-
tude owners that reversion in such a case was to them, for it was
contended that the royalty was "an appendage to the mineral
12. 60 So. 2d 9 (La. 1952).
13. Ibid.
14. 60 So. 2d 65 (La. 1952).
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interest."' 5 Provisions of the lease agreement are not set forth
in the opinion.
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
MARRIAGE, SEPARATION, AND DIVORCE'
The attempts of a husband to have his wife committed to an
institution, or his use of "deceit and physical force" in attempting
to confine her, do not amount to cruelty warranting separation
from bed and board unless the action is taken without probable
cause. This is the conclusion in Kalpakis v. Kalpakis.2 The court
reasoned that in some instances it may be the duty of a spouse
to seek the commitment or confinement of the other, and that
often a person in need of mental treatment must be tricked or
forced to accept it. Consistent with this view, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff's petition failed to state a cause of action
because it did not affirmatively allege the unjustifiable character
of the defendant's conduct. The case is a novel one in Louisiana,
but there should be no doubt that such conduct, if actually unjusti-
fiable, constitutes cruelty under the jurisprudence applying
Article 138 of the Civil Code.'
Eals v. Swan4 affirmed the judicial practice of applying the
doctrine of comparative rectitude in separation and divorce cases.
In our jurisprudence, as the decisions cited in the Eals case show,
our legislation allowing divorce or separation for cause has been
regarded as measures "for the relief of the oppressed party," and
judgments have not been rendered in favor of either in instances
in which each party has given cause to the other and neither can
15. Id. at 67.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Decisions treating of questions of fact or settled legal questions relat-
ing to marriage, separation, or divorce and not discussed herein are Succes-
sion of Allen, 220 La. 365, 56 So. 2d 577 (1951)-proof of marriage, require-
ments for putative marriage; Meyer v. Hackler, 219 La. 750, 54 So. 2d 7
(1951)-standard of proof and sufficiency of evidence of adultery and recon-
ciliation, and reconventional demands in divorce and separation suits; and
Massa v. Thompson, 220 La. 278, 56 So. 2d 422 (1952), Kieffer v. Heriard, 221
La. 151, 58 So. 2d 836 (1952), and Clay v. Clay, 221 La. 258, 59 So. 2d 182 (1952)
-evidence or proof of adultery.
2. 60 So. 2d 217 (La. 1952).
3. Extreme cases on what may be considered cruelty are Spansenberg v.
Carter, 151 La. 1038, 92 So. 673 (1922) and Moore v. Moore, 192 La. 289, 187 So.
670 (1939).
4. 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952).
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